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In five years of World War II up to April 1945 the equivalent of 25
million fuiltime workers moved into civilian and military employments
in the United States, raising the number of equivalent jobholders from
45 to 70 million, that is, to more than three for every two workers occu-
pied in the spring of 1940.
These additions enabled civilian employments to augment their
strength. 13 million (nearly 30 percent) while the armed forces were
calling up 12 million men. Over 5 million equivalent workers came
from increases in hours, mostly overtime, nearly 8 million from reem-
ployment of idle persons already in the labor force in 1940, 1 '1.5 million
from expansion in the labor force itself. The labor force includes wage
and salary earners (on both public and private payrolls), employers,
and self-employed persons whether full or parttime or seeking work.
Employed persons, including civilian and military,;in creased 42 per-
cent in the United States, slightly more than in Canada, three times as
much as in Britain, and four times as much as in Germany (counting
in Germany active armed forces and 7 million foreigners; counting only
citizens, the number of Germans mobilized for employment barely rose
at all). The civilian employed increased a sixth in the United States and
possibly afifthin Canada. Britain and Germany were less fortunate. The
former, with slower population growth and less prewar unemployment
than the two North American nations, had suffered an actual diminu-
tion of about 4 percent by 1943 and 8 percent by 1945, made up in the
earlier year by the average worker putting in 9 percent more hours.
German civilian employed fell, by mid-1943, over a fifth below 1939;
if foreigners are counted, a fifteenth. Compensating extensions in hours
were minor. The workweek gained no more than 4 percent in the first
2 years and lost most of that by 1944.
The 11.5 million expansion in the wartime labor force of the United
States was half again the combined increases of Great Britain, Canada,
and Germany (even counting the foreigners pressed into work in that
country). Part of the huge American rise was due to rapid population
growth.
Excluding the part due to population growt4, the labor force rose
8.5 million in the United States, 1.8 million in Britain, and 0.6 million
in Canada. In relation to working age population, the American labor
1force rose from 54.1 percent before the war to 62.3 percent at the war
peak, or 8.2 percent compared with 6.8 in Canada and 4.7 percent in
Great Britain. In some degree, however, the comparison with prewar is
favorable to the 'United States and Canada and unfavorable to Great
Britain, for the formers' labor force proportions were depressed in 1940
or 1939 whereas the latter's was expanded somewhat in view of the
war mobilization already partly in effect. Based on the postwar (1947)
labor force proportions, the wartime excess is 6.4 percent in the United
States, 5.4 percent in Britain, and 5.1 percent in Canada.
On any basis of comparison Germany made the poorest record for
gettIng wartime additions. Its labor force lost natives, even debiting it
with no war deaths; counting foreigners, its expansion was still much
less than that in the United States. This failure to get additional Ger-
mans to work or .seek work cannot be attributed to emigration, Allied
bombing, 'high' birthrates, small reserves of women in the peacetime
labor force, or somewhat more complete mobilization at the start of
the war.
The inflows 1.0thelabor force were dominated by the military draft.
Until the armed forces were enlarged, the labor force expanded neg-
ligibly. With the demobilization of nine-tenths of the peak armed
strength the United States labor force shrank eight-tenths of its excess
over prewar (disregarding the population growth). United States addi-
tions to the labor force averaged for the war about 70 for every 100
men taken into the armed forces. The relation between the labor force
and the draft was not uniform, however. Indeed its variations reveal the
influence of unemployment. The number who moved into the labor
force for each 100 conscripted by the armed forces was relatively large
—between70 and 119 —inthe early part of the war when unemploy-
ment was shrinking rapidly, and relatively small —about50 —inthe
last two years when unemployment was close to a minimum and there-
fore no longer declining. The average for the five years was 72, almost
the same as for Canada during 1939-45.. The ratios of labor force to
armed force increases in the other two countries were very different: in
Great Britain, 47 during 1939-43 and a substantial negative amount
during the last two years; in Germany, zero or negative during 1939-44.
Femalesthis country were a bit Over half the addition to the
labor force. (including the part due to the population. growth), eight-
tenths in Britain. Excluding the part due to population rise, for every
2hundred females at work before the war the United States added 35,
Britain 21, and Canada 19 (compared with 1941); Germany relin-
quished 1. For every hundred males the United States added 9, Canada
6, Britain 2, and Germany 0.3.
Besides increases in employment and hours, there were large transfers
into more essential jobs. The major shifts to war production in all four
countries' probably occurred within industries. Nevertheless, there was
no lack of inter-industry mobility. In the United States all industry
groups except agriculture took on personnel during the first years. By
1943 industrial employment (manufacturing, mining, and construc-
tion) had exceeded 1939 levels by about half. By 1945 transportation
had expanded almost three-fourths; services (government, professional,
and domestic) over a fourth; trade, distribution, and finance held their
own.
In Great Britain industrial employment went down after 1942;,in
1945 it was below 1939, though the fluctuations were never wide. Agri-
culture, services, and 'transportation remained about the same during
the six years, and commerce, trade, and finance lost heavily up to 1943.
Britain built up its war industries and agriculture by severely curtailing
domestic services, construction, trade, distribution, finance, and the
manufacture of clothes, food, and beverages.
The Germans were less ingenious, or determined, than the British in
restricting nonessentials. Throughout the war, domestic service, employ-
ing chiefly native Germans, was almost undisturbed. Agriculture and
industry parted with workers at first, but by the war's end had just
about gotten them back. Employment fell in most service industries, also
in commerce,' trade, and finance. Transportation made negligible gains.
Compulsion was not important in recruiting wartime labor. The
United States never required civilians to work. Germany had universal
conscription on paper but did not thoroughly enforce it until after the
Allied landing, when it was too late to use the extra labor effectively.
Half of Britain's additions were made before the National Service Act.
Even after that, its policy was still persuasion. Coercion was not relied
upon extensively until the last two years, durin.g which, paradoxically,
the labor force as a whole and essential employment were both declining.
Four factors may have influenced movements to the labor force:
reserves of extra workers among students, housewives, and the elderly;
numbers of young children, husbands, and brothers requiring care at
3home and preventing girls and women from taking gainful work; liber-
ality of government to dependents of fighting men; and strength of
enemy blOws. These explain the large proportion added to the labor
force in the United States which had more females outside its peace-
time labor force than the British or Germans, so that more could go
into industry in wartime despite a 'higher proportion of child cares. It
was less openhanded than Germany or Canada in caring for dependents,
though by no means niggardly. And it avoided the German and Cana-
dian practice of reducing dependents' allowances if'they worked for pay.
Most additions came when the enemy was 'hitting hardest. In Britain
six in ten of the labor force additions were made before the USSR was
forced into the war; in this country two in three during the two years
up to the Italian surrender in mid-1943; in Germany the few native
workers after the Stalingrad disaster. Canada, an auxiliary belligerent,
distributed its expansion fairly evenly throughout the. 'first five years of
the war.
The homeward bound forces Of the three English-speaking victors
trailed the exodus of civilians. The latter quit war industries first, shift-
ing into less essential sectors as pipelines filled, then' left 'the labor force
itself as sisters, wives, and fiáncees went home to await the returning
warriors. The entire shrinkage of the labor force occurred in the United
States between March. 1945 and May 1946. It took longer, in Canada
and Britain but was about complete 'by early 1947.
Aside from the part due to population growth, the great bulk of the
labor force excess over prewar turned out to be temporary in all three
countries. (No satisfactory postwar comparisons can be made for dis-
membered Germany.) In America the labor force did not goal! the way
back to its, 1940 proportion of the population, misleading many into
believing it was still expanded from the war. This belief arose from
failure to perceive that the. labor 'force at ,the turn of the 1940'.s was
somewhat depressed, probably by the widespread unemployment.
So far in the Korean conflict the labor force has shown Indications
of retracing its early World War II patterns by rising as the armed forces
expand. However, its ratio to armed force recruitments was less than
half that in 1941-42, possibly because in April 1940 the labor force
proportion was depressed whereas in April 1950 it was already mildly
inflated. During the four years ahead, if a major war comes, this coun-
try probably could, by drawing on its reserves inside and outside the
labor force, conscript 9 million more men without diminishing the
4civilian employment of 60 million in April 1951. It could get another
5 million equivalent workers by increasing hours. This 8 percent poten-
tial rise in civilian employment is less than the almost 30 percent increase
in the five years after April 1940. Still, if it is assumed that the mobiliza-
tion is now, relatively speaking, about where it was in the spring after
Pearl Harbor, the effective employment yet possible is on a par with
that realized after April 1942.
2THE LABOR FORCE BEFORE WORLD WAR II
In spring 1939 the United States had a little over 44 million employed
and nearly 10 million unemployed.1 Its labor force, the sum of these two
figures, was somewhat below what it would have been had the same
proportion of working age population been at work or seeking work as
in such years of peace and low unemployment as 1930 or 1947.2 A third
of a million were in uniform. Germany by early summer had reduced
unemployment to almost nil, restored its slightly depressed labor force
to the same proportion of the population as in and mustered a
military force which, though still far under its subsequent strength, was
1Mytables for the United States (1, A, and 2, A), which are based on Work Pioj-
ects Administration and Bureau of the Census monthly sample surveys of about
25,000 households, do not begin until 1940 and, in order to keep clear of the summer
influx, which is particularly large in this country, compare Aprils instead of mid.
years. The labor force, armed forces, unemployment, and civilian employment in
April 1939 are computed to be 54.1, 0.3, 9.7, and 44.1 million respectively. It was
assumed that between April 1939 and 1940 the labor force rose 0.7 million from the
growth in population. Armed forces and unemployed were taken from the Economic
Almanac for 1950 (National Industrial Conference Board), p. 164; civilian employ-
ment was the residual.
2Theproportion of population 14 and older in the labor force in April 1940, as
revised by the Census to be comparable to the 1945 enumeration technique, was 54.1
percent, 1.8 percent below the 55.9 percent measured by the same technique in 1947
and 2.0 percent below the 56.1 percent in 1930. I revised the labor force in 1930 to
make it comparable to the 1945 technique. With a working age population in 1940
of 101 million, this deficiency in the labor force proportion involves 1.8 million
workers. Since the 1939 labor force is estimated by cxtrapolating backward from
1940 on the basis of mere population change, the estimated deficiency'would be
approximately the same. See Section 2 for an explanation of the 1945 measurement
technique.
8LeoWolman has disclosed that early increases in employment claimed by the Nazis
were really a statistical reclassification in which formerly idle persons doing
work comparable to the United States WPA were regarded as employed: 'The Mean-
ing of Employment and Unemployment', The State in Society (Oxford University
Press, 1940). By 1939 approaching war had probably made German employment
reasonably genuine.
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